Posts Tagged ‘peter’

U.S. Supreme Court says Mojave Desert Cross can stay–it is a War Memorial, article by Peter Menkin

A World War I memorial will be allowed to stay in the Mojave Desert, and though covered since 2002 because it offended some people as a religious symbol is now unveiled again. It was the United States Supreme Court that allowed the Cross, on private land owned by the Veterans of Foreign Wars to stay after a protracted controversy. The Cross has stood for about 75 years in the desert. The question came to, Is the Cross religious symbol for Christians solely, or War Memorial for American dead?

In California and even San Francisco’s Bay Area the subject of a cross in a remote desert spot in the Mojave was a highly controversial matter. What about the cross on public land? Does this not violate separation of Church and State? was hotly asked.
 
A religious symbol cannot be on public land, said Frank Buono who is now retired from the Park Service. He brought the case to The Supreme Court over a ten year period with the help of The American Civil Liberties Union. According to The New York Times, “The white wooden cross, roughly 5 feet tall, stands atop Sunrise Rock in California’s San Bernardino County.” It is actually made of pipe today. The Supreme Court did not say whether this was a simple, dignified, and even popular War Memorial of little note but some popularity among the private individuals who visited it, and those who built it. The Court took on this almost humble case that to some appeared overblown.
 
A PDF of the Supreme Court decision is here.
 
The announcement of the Court’s result was made and reported in major newspapers April 28, 2010. Writing for the Supreme Court in Salazar v. Buono, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said:
“The District Court concentrated solely on the religious aspects of the cross, divorced from its background and context. But a Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs. It is a symbol often used to honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble contributions, and patient striving help secure an honored place in history for this Nation and its people. Here, one Latin cross in the desert evokes far more than religion. It evokes thousands of small crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans who fell in battles, battles whose tragedies are compounded if the fallen are forgotten.”
 
The Veterans of Foreign Wars agreed. One could easily surmise that’s the real issue, the real case from their vantage point. Many veterans agreed.
 
Gabriel Nelson, writing in his blog in The New York Times, said, “The Supreme Court ruled today that Congress and the Interior Department acted properly when they used a land transfer to solve a dispute over a cross on display in the federal Mojave National Preserve.”
 
There was no big hullaballoo, but a minimal statement with dissent by the Supreme Court. Gabriel Nelson put it well in his low key remark on how the Interior Department had acted properly. This writer has taken some snippets from other newspaper reports that demonstrate all are in accord in their reporting of the facts, and as the Supreme Court noted it was the facts that led them to their conclusions on the decision.
 
In its brief on behalf of Interior Secretary Ken Salazar, Solicitor General Elena Kagan said the cross did not imply government sponsorship. The transfer of land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars that required the installation of a plaque dissociating the statue from the federal government, she wrote, satisfied the problem of Church/State religion (Christian).
 
The Christian Post said in its report, “The goal of avoiding governmental endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in the public realm,” wrote Justice Anthony Kennedy. “This cross,” he wrote, “evokes thousands of small crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans who fell in battles.”
 
As a taste of the real argument in differences on the United States Supreme Court, it appears to this writer that Justice Anthony Kennedy caught the essence of the issue separating Justices. The Wall Street Journal noted in their report, Justice Stevens’s dissent argued that Congress wasn’t taking action to memorialize veterans, but rather using their memory to justify maintenance of a religious symbol. He noted that the Mojave cross little resembles the prominent and nonsectarian markers erected for those who served in World War II, Korea or Vietnam.
 
JESS BRAVIN Wall Street Journal writer pointed out in his article, The cross—estimated at five to seven feet tall—stands on Sunrise Rock in a remote patch of desert. Veterans, some of whom had moved to the region for health reasons, first erected a cross at the site in 1934 and it was often used for Easter services. The current version was assembled from painted metal pipes in 1998 by Henry Sandoz of Yucca Valley, Calif.
 
Though The Wall Street Journal called the decision one whereby the Cross was determined more war memorial than religious symbol, the grass roots battle in California called for many statements that: Yes, it was significantly and first a war memorial, but it was a religious statement for the war dead. There the Supreme Court did not necessarily agree, but it did not make sweeping decisions. Justice Kennedy wrote, Because of the “highly fact-specific nature” of the case, it is “unsuited for announcing categorical rules.”
 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor joined Justice Stevens’s dissent. Justice Stephen Breyer dissented separately.
 
Images:  (1) Mojave Desert Cross, by Associated Press; (2) Mojave Desert Cross, by unknown.

Supreme Courts Bars Challenge to ?peter Scot? on Principles of Acquiescence And/ or Waiver

Khoday Distilleries Limited (Now known as Khoday India Limited) filed an appeal against judgment and order dated 12th October, 2007 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Trade Mark Second Appeal (TMSA) No. 2 of 1998 affirming the judgment and order dated 25th September, 1998 passed in

T.M.A. No.3 of 1989 whereby and whereunder an appeal preferred by the appellant herein under Section 109 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 arising out of an order dated 12th May, 1979, against rectification of its mark by The Scotch Whisky Association and others before Registrar of Trademarks.

Khoday is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and manufactures whisky under the mark “Peter Scot” since May, 1968.  Its application for registration of its mark was accepted and allowed to proceed with the advertisement, subject to the condition that the mark would be treated as associated with Reg. T.M. No.249226-B. The said trade mark was registered.

Respondents came to know of the appellants mark on or about 20th September, 1974.   They filed an application for rectification of the said trade mark on 21st April, 1986.  Appellant by way of affidavit explained coining of the mark “Peter Scot” where “Peter” was his father’s name and “Scot” was his nationality. Another factor behind the coining of this brand name was the internationally known British explorer, Captain  Scott, and his son Peter Scott, who is widely known as an artist, naturalist and Chairman of the World Wildlife Fund.

However, the application for rectification was allowed. The appellant then preferred an appeal was preferred there against by the appellant before the High Court in terms of Section 109 of the Act. In one of the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents affirmed by Ian Barclay it was stated that the respondents were aware of infringement of mark as far back in 1974 but as no action was taken in relation thereto till 1986, the application for rectification was barred under the principles of waiver and acquiescence.

A learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the said appeal and as regards the plea of acquiescence held that The acquiescence if it is to be made a ground for declining to rectify, must be of such a character as to establish gross-negligence on the part of the applicant or deliberate inaction which had regulated in the appellant incurring substantial expenditure or being misled into the belief that the respondents though entitled to, had deliberately refrained from taking any action and were unmindful of the use of the mark by the person in whose name it was registered and held that the facts of this case are not such as to warrant the conclusion that there has been acquiescence.

On an appeal a Division Bench of the High Court, dismissed the said appeal and appellant approached the Supreme Court against said order.

Taking into considerations all peculiar facts of the case as well as precedents laid down by Supreme Court it was observed that stand of respondents to object to the evidence that was produced before the learned Single Judge with regard to the increase in the volume of sale of Peter Scot, on the other hand urging  that if a comparison is made of the Indian whisky and Scotch Whisky it would appear that some Indian whiskies are costlier than some of the Scottish brands.  The stand taken by the respondents is self contradictory and is not fair and Supreme Court was of opinion that action of the respondents is barred under the principles of acquiescence and/ or waiver.

As regards the question as to consideration is as to whether the use of the term Scot would itself be a sufficient ground to form an opinion that the mark Peter Scot is deceptive or confusing. The Supreme Court relied upon precedents operating in Australia and United States of America.

The Supreme Court observed that we are concerned with the class of buyer who supposed to know the value of money, the quality and content of Scotch Whisky.  They are supposed to be aware of the difference of the process of manufacture, the place of manufacture and their origin.  Respondent No.3, the learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, failed to notice the distinction, which is real and otherwise borne out from the precedents operating in the field. The SC further observed that had these tests been applied the matter might have been different.  In a given case probably SC would not have interfered but intend to do so only because wrong tests applied led to a wrong result.

It has held that so far as the applicability of the 1999 Act is concerned, having regard to the provisions of Sections 20(2) and 26(2), we are of the opinion that the 1999 Act will have no application.

The Supreme Court vide its judgement dated 27/05/2008 allowed the appeal and dismissed the impugned judgement of High Court, thereby cancelling the rectification proceedings in respect of “Peter Scot’ mark and reinstating the Registration.

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