Law and Justice

Posts Tagged ‘Court’

Holland v. Florida, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4946 (U.S. June 14, 2010)

Factual Background:

  A death row inmate has filed a writ of habeas corpus approximately five weeks late under the 1-year statute of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d),which the District Court denied pointing one year statute of limitation.

  The record facts reveal, inter alia, that Holland’s court-appointed attorney, Bradley Collins, had failed to file a timely federal petition, despite Holland’s many letters emphasizing the importance of doing so; that Collins apparently did not do the research necessary to find out the proper filing date, despite the fact that Holland had identified the applicable legal rules for him; that Collins failed to inform Holland in a timely manner that the State Supreme Court had decided his case, despite Holland’s many pleas for that information; and that Collins failed to communicate with Holland over a period of years, despite Holland’s pleas for responses  to his letters. Meanwhile, Holland repeatedly requested that the state courts and the Florida bar remove Collins from his case, which has been denied by the court responding that Holland could not file any pro se papers with the court while he was represented by counsel, including papers seeking new counsel. Based on these and other record facts, Holland asked the Federal District Court to toll the AEDPA limitations period for equitable reasons. It refused, holding that he had not demonstrated the due diligence necessary to invoke equitable tolling. Affirming, the Eleventh Circuit held that, regardless of diligence, Holland’s case did not constitute “extraordinary circumstances.” Specifically, it held that when a petitioner seeks to excuse a late filing based on his attorney’s unprofessional conduct, that conduct, even if grossly negligent, cannot justify equitable tolling absent proof of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment, or the like.

Supreme Court’s Opinion:
  The Court first decided that timeliness provision in the federal habeas corpus statute is subject to equitable tolling.

  Several considerations support the Court’s holding. First, because AEDPA’s “statute of limitations defense . . . is not ‘jurisdictional,’” Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205, 213, 126 S. Ct. 1675, 164 L. Ed. 2d 376, it is subject to a “rebuttable presumption” in favor “of equitable tolling,” Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96, 111 S. Ct. 453, 112 L. Ed. 2d 435. The Eleventh Circuit’s per se standard is too rigid. A “petitioner” is “entitled to equitable tolling” if he shows “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way” and prevented timely filing.

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On the last day of the 2006-2007 Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Roberts announced a decision that will inevitably stir up diversity issues within schools across the nation, and the Chicago Schools. It will most certainly change the way most school systems, including those within the Chicago Schools, run their magnet programs. And it will affect how they decide which students to steer towards, and to accept into, each program.

The decision decried racial balancing in schools where race is used for magnet programs. Many of the magnets within the Chicago Schools use race as a factor in accepting students into their programs. There is one group of magnets in the Chicago Schools that selects students based completely on racially weighted lotteries. The students’ applications are sorted according to race, and then drawn in lotteries. This is meant to achieve racial diversity. Acceptance into other magnet programs is based on grades, test scores, academic achievement, and extracurricular involvement. Race is used as a minimal determining factor.

Some administrators in the Chicago Schools fear that this threatens the legacy of Brown v. Board of Education; the decision in which segregation based on color was denounced.

Patrick Rock, the attorney for Chicago Schools, stated that the decision will only affect Chicago Schools if and when a federal justice agrees to release them from a desegregation consent decree which dates all the way back to 1980. He stated that at some point in the future the Chicago Schools may ask to have the decree dissolved but states “‘the question is when”. Rock also said that the Supreme Court ruling only affects how the Chicago Schools run their programs after the decree is dissolved. That may not be until the fall of 2008. This is when the application process will begin for the 2009 school year. In the meantime Chicago Schools’ magnets will continue to use the same criteria for admittance into the programs.

Administrators say that Chicago Schools use race as a determining factor to keep schools racially diverse. Not as a means to segregation. The Supreme Court ruling does not disallow the Chicago Schools from using race. It simply states that a valid and compelling reason must be given for doing so. In the Chicago Schools these reasons often include ensuring racial diversity in the many areas where it doesn’t exist.

Rock doesn’t feel that the Chicago Schools will eliminate magnet programs in order to avoid litigation, however, there are those on the Supreme Court who feel that many school systems nationwide may begin to dissolve their magnet programs to avoid litigation and its ensuing costs. The Chicago Schools may choose to use race as a way to determine where to build schools to ensure this diversity, how to fund schools in certain areas, and which programs to steer students towards- based more on their talents and achievements and not solely to fill a certain percentage of racial mix.

On July 31, 2010 Justice Michael F. Cavanagh writing for the Michigan Supreme Court majority decided McCormick v. Carrier, Case No. 136738 (MI July 31, 2010) and overruled the previous standard for recovery for a personal injury under Michigan’s no-fault liability laws.

The majority decided in favor of Plaintiff, finding that McCormick suffered a serious impairment of a body function.

At issue in this Michigan Supreme Court case is the proper interpretation of the “serious impairment of body function” threshold for non-economic tort liability under MCL 500.3135.

Before this ruling overruled the previous standard, the standard for the threshold for non-economic tort liability in Michigan was set by the Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling in Kreiner. The Kreiner standard held that for an injury to be cognizable, there must be a serious impairment of a bodily function that prohibits plaintiff from living his normal life and further required that an “objectively manifested impairment” be evidenced by medical testimony.

Addressing the issue of the proper threshold for non-economic tort liability in McCormick v. Carrier, the Michigan Supreme Court majority overruled the Kreiner standard;

“We hold that Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109; 683 NW2d 611 (2004), was wrongly decided because it departed from the plain language of MCL 500.3135, and is therefore overruled.”

The Michigan Supreme Court’s McCormick decision did the following to the previous Kreimer threshold for non-economic tort liability;

1. Removed the requirement that an “objectively manifested impairment” be evidenced by medical testimony;
2. Stated that the “affects a person’s ability to lead his or her normal life” standard is subjective and should be determined on a case by case basis;
3. Drew attention to the fact that a person’s normal life prior to the accident need only be “affected” and not “destroyed”;
4. The language only requires that the “ability” be affected–meaning a person’s “normal life” need not be affected if it is harder, because of an effect on ability, to lead that normal life;
5. There is no time restriction on a “serious impairment.”  It could last only a few days;
6. The impairment doesn’t have to affect the entire course of the injured party’s life as implied by Kreimer; and
7. The court threw out the judicially created factors that compare a person’s pre-accident life to his post-accident life.

The new test under the McCormick standard is the following:

(A) Determine whether there is a factual issue as to whether an impairment of an important bodily function has occurred;
(B) If there is no factual dispute, or no material factual dispute, the court may determine whether the threshold is met as a matter of law; and
(C) Apply the McCormick test, which is fact specific and must be considered on a case by case basis, to recover for non-economic tort liability one must demonstrate:

(1) An objectively manifested impairment (observable or perceivable from actual symptoms or conditions);
(2) Of an important body function (a body function of value, significance, or consequence to the injured person), that;
(3) Affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life (influences some of the plaintiff’s capacity to live in his or her normal manner of living).

To get the full opinion click on Rodney McCormick v. Larry Carrier and Allied Automotive Group, Inc., indemnitor of General Motors Corporation.

For more information about Michigan’s no-fault laws and the previous (Kreiner) standard;

Kreiner Decision Tortures Michigan No-Fault Law

Understand Your Michigan No-Fault Rights

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Recently, the United States Supreme Court decided a case on the property rights of inventors. The question was whether a business method is enough of an invention to receive a patent. Patents are a form of intellectual property. They give Replacement 9-Cell Dell Inspiron 1501 Battery legal protections to individuals and companies against the copying of their inventions. Bernard Bilski and Rand Warsaw wanted to patent a method to let traders protect against the risk of price changes in energy markets. The United States Patent and Trademark Office said no. So the inventors went to court. Again they were told no. Finally, the case went all the way to the Supreme Court.

Last month, all nine justices said no. But they only said no to a patent in this case. Patent lawyer Meredith Martin Addy in Chicago explains that the court ruled narrowly. MEREDITH MARTIN ADDY: “The Supreme Court held that there is no categorical rule denying patent protection for business method patents.” When patent laws were first developed, most patents were for machines. But since the late nineteen nineties, inventors of business methods and processes have increasingly sought patent protection. Rand Warsaw discussing his Supreme Court case at his offices in Pittsburgh, dell 9-Cell Dell RU006 Battery Pennsylvania last year Technology companies, especially software makers, watched the case closely. They were concerned that the Supreme Court would require a test of some kind that could limit what can be patented. In its ruling, the court decided against the patent only because the idea was too abstract. Law professor Michael Meurer of Boston University gives a famous example from physics. It involves the relationship of energy, mass and the speed of light, written as the letter

c. MICHAEL MEURER: “The Supreme Court has said, for example, if Albert Einstein determined that E = mc squared — which he did — he never would have been able to get a patent on that. That’s too abstract.” In the Bilski case, the court said patent examiners could consider what is known as the machine-or-transformation test. This is the idea that a patent should be given to a machine or something that creates a material change, like a chemical process. But a majority of justices said patent examiners must also protect innovation. Patent lawyer Meredith Martin Addy says no one wants to suppress creativity. 9-Cell Dell Y4367 Battery : “You can have that test, but it can’t be an exclusive test because of the nature of the patent laws which are to protect new and unknown inventions.” Now, more cases will be needed to define the legal limits of business method patents. Such patents already exist. In March, for example, after re-examination, Amazon.com received a patent for its one-click ordering process.

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Courts make determinations in law and in equity. By ‘in law’ is meant following a specific law – constitutional law, state law, etc. By ‘in equity’ is meant determining what is ‘fair’ to do where now law specifically rules. An example is determining how to distribute the assets in a divorce among the husband and wife.

Common law refers to the myriad of decisions made by judges and appeals courts. Maxims of Common Law are ‘guiding truths’. Adhering to them helps judges make fairer decisions. They’re ignored in family court determinations since fairness is a wholly secondary issue. This article overviews what these maxims are.

Maxims are absolutely essential to the preservation of rights and fair treatment to all litigants. Maxims:

* represent ‘self-evident’ truth – as mentioned in our Declaration of Independence when it referred to ‘all men’ as being created equal.

* serve to guide judicial determinations in the same way that ‘axioms’ guide the analysis of mathematical determinations

* promotes fair dealing and unbiased justice – a clearly essential issue in the purpose of courts

Courts, primarily established to enforce the principles of common law, are bound by common law rules of equity that should be grounded in the never-changing maxims. This grounding serves to restrain the court’s wanton discretion in equity law determinations.

Examples of Maxims:

Let’s take a look at some examples to see the nature of maxims -as self-evidently fair. Here’s an important one:

*The certainty of a thing arises only from making a thing certain.

This implies that the court should seek clear proof of allegations made against someone and not rule on just the allegations or weakly supported ones. Family court ignores these maxims all the time.

*The safety of the people cannot be judged but by the safety of every individual.

Laws which supposedly protect the safety of some people at the expense of other people’s rights violate this maxim. A clear example of such a violation is present day domestic restraining order laws which are rampantly and unjustly imposed upon so many fathers.

*Law is unjust where it is uncertain or vague in its meaning.

Laws should be clear so that one knows precisely when he’s breaking such a law. Remember the violation of laws brings consequences on those who violate them. Vague laws are considered unconstitutional. An example of vague standard of law is the ‘best interest of the child’ standard – used to unjustly deny fit fathers custody of their children.

*The Burden of Proof lies on him who asserts the fact -not on him who denies it.

This is based on the fact that you can’t prove a negative. Courts that force people to prove a negative are examples of kangaroo courts. Family courts jail fathers when they can’t prove that they don’t have money to pay!

*No one should be believed except upon his oath.

This simply means that anyone who will give testimony must be sworn in. That way he can be charged with perjury – which is a felony (a serious crime) – if he can be found to be intentionally lying. No ‘swearing in’ means no perjury and no penalty for lying.

*Perjured witnesses should be punished for perjury and for the crimes they falsely accuse against him.

This is the bottom line of enforcing honesty in court testimony. Unfortunately perjury is almost never punished -allowing the degradation of court integrity – so obvious in family court.

*Every home is a castle; though the winds of heaven blow through it, officers of the state cannot enter.

This is from English common law which made a man’s home sacrosanct. It should still be true. It requires officers to have warrants to enter a home. A warrant is permission from a judge based on good cause to enter a home.

*No man should profit by his own wrong or, He who does not have clean hands, cannot benefit from the law

This is self-evident. An extreme case is the child that pleads mercy because he’s an orphan – but only because he murdered his parents.

*He who uses his legal rights harms no one.

But, fathers are routinely punished by seeking their rights in family court.

*No one is punished unless for some wrong act or fault.

But forced into the noncustodial status for doing no wrong would be considered punishment by any reasonable person.

*It’s natural that he who bears the charge of a thing, should receive the profits.

If you have all the obligations for something but none of the benefits, then you are a slave.

Fathers who go to family court observe clear violations of these maxims all the time. Such violations mean that there is a tyranny taking place.

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The Challenge to the NCLT & NCALT:

The five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India Justice KG Balakrishnan, Justice RV Raveendran, Justice DK Jain, Justice P Sathasivam and Justice JM Panchal has delivered its judgment on the legality of the constitution of National Company Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal under the Companies Act, 1956 through Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002.

With the intention of establishing a Separate Tribunal to deal with all issues or disputes under the Companies Act, 1956, a Special Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal called National Company Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal were sought to be established through the Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002. As per the said amendment, as soon as the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal is constituted, almost all powers exercised by the High Court under the Companies Act, 1956 sought to be transferred to the NCLT and NCLAT except the judicial review powers exercised under Article 226 and 227 of Constitution of India.

Sri R.Gandhi of Madras Bar Association has challenged the Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002 and especially the constitution of National Company Law Tribunal and National Company Appellate Tribunal.

The conclusion of Madras High Court:

Justice Jayasimha Babu of Madras High Court has delivered a considered and landmark judgment on the issue of legality of constitution of National Company Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. The background of the constitution of Tribunal in India as referred in the Judgment is as follows:

“The Tribunals which are largely a twentieth century phenomenon existed in this country even before the Constitution was framed. The oldest and best known Tribunal is the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which had been functioning from the year 1941. Industrial Tribunals had also been established prior to 1950. Articles 136 and 227 of the Constitution refer to Tribunals, and make their orders subject to judicial review by the High Court, and with leave, to the Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Numerous Tribunals have been created subsequent to 1950 by Parliamentary as well as State legislation. Their exact number however is not easily ascertainable. The Law Commission of India in its 162nd Report submitted in 1998 reviewed the working of the major tribunals in the country – the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Customs, Central Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal and the Administrative Tribunals, and suggested certain changes to improve their functioning.

The object of constituting Tribunals is to provide a simpler, speedier and more accessible justice than ordinary courts are able to provide, as stated in Wade on Administrative Law. Yet another object of constituting Tribunals is to create specialist Tribunals which would include specialists in the filed, to adjudicate more efficiently and speedily the matters requiring adjudication in that field, and thus command the confidence of all concerned in the quality and reliability of the result of such adjudication.”

The Operative portion of the Judgment of the Madras High Court is as follows:

“In the light of foregoing discussions it is declared that until the provisions in Parts 1B and 1C of the Companies Act introduced by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2002, which have been found to be defective in as much as they are in breach of the basic constitutional scheme of separation of powers and independence of the judicial function, are duly amended, by removing the defects that have been pointed out, it would be unconstitutional to constitute a Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal exercise the jurisdiction now exercised by the High Courts or the Company Law Board.

The petitioners have also challenged the validity of certain provisions of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2002, whereby certain powers currently exercised by the Company Law Board, some of which were earlier exercised by the court, were transferred to the Central Government. Most of those powers are only tangentially judicial and are primarily administrative. There is no illegality in such transfer.”

The Judgment of the Madras High Court was a very detailed, considered and reasoned judgment. The Apprehension of the Petitioners who challenged the Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002 and the conclusion of the Court on the issue is summed up in one para of the Judgment as follows:

“The constitution of the National Company Law Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal in the manner now provided, when considered along with the provisions concerning the Competition Commission under the Competition Act 2002, seems to indicate a pattern of an aggressive executive seeking to take over gradually the judicial power traditionally exercised by the courts under safeguards which ensure the competence, independence and impartiality of the judges, and replacing them by persons who have neither a judicial background nor specialized knowledge of the subject for which the Tribunal is created, and by persons now serving the executive who will continue to retain their lien and loyalty to the executive branch, and be amenable to the influence of executive superiors and their political masters.”

The doyens of the Madras Bar Association Shri Aravind P.Datar, Senior Advocate and Shri V.T.Gopalan, the then Additional Solicitor-General has rendered exceptional assistance to the Court in the matter before Madras High Court and the same is acknowledged by the Madras High Court in its judgment as follows:

“We place on record our appreciation to Mr.Arvind Datar, learned senior counsel of petitioner, whose research and cogent presentation has helped to clarify and bring out the significance of the issues involved, and to Mr.V.T.Gopalan, learned Additional Solicitor-General who, with his usual fairness presented the case for the respondent with great vigour, and also placed before the court all the relevant materials.”

Appeal to the Supreme Court:

The Judgment of the Madras High Court on the issue of constitution of National Company Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal was appealed before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court has now appears to have confirmed the judgment of the Madras High Court. The Madras High Court has never questioned the legislative competency in establishing National Company Law Tribunal, but, expressed its concern over the independence of the mechanism and its effectiveness. It’s really laudable.

Further process:

Now, the entire Companies Act, 1956 sought to be reorganized with some inclusions and deletions through Companies Bill, 2009. I don’t know as to how the Government has proceeded with the Companies Bill when an important issue on the Constitution of National Company Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal was pending before the Apex Court. Now, the concerned ministry has to take note of the judgment of the Apex Court and should make needed changes to the proposed bill and then, the Companies Bill can be introduced in the Parliament and it needs to be passed. It will take some time, but, the entire issue can be quicken as the needed infrastructure for the establishment of National Company Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal was already in place as I believe.

My opinion on the Tribunal:

Many feel that there is lot of difference between a Tribunal and the Court, but, I disagree with the notion. The Tribunal is also a Court intended to resolve the disputes, but, it is constituted under a special enactment and may follow different procedure as enshrined in the enactment.

A constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd. V. P.N.Sharma, AIR 1965SC1595, speaking throughour great justice Gajendragadkar, C.J., while holding that the appellate authority under the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952, is a Tribunal, observed:

“…Special matter and questions re entrusted to them for their decision and in that sense, they share with the courts one common characteristic; both the courts and the Tribunals are ‘constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions…’ They are both adjudicated bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to the jurisdiction….As in the case of courts, so in the case of Tribunals, it is the State’s inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power, it is the State’s inherent judicial function which hey discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the state transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the courts established by  the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to Tribunals by entrusting tot hem the task of adjudicated upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the Tribunals and the courts, and features which are distinct and separate. The basis and the fundamental feature which is common to both the courts and the Tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign state.”

The observations of Justice Gajedragadkar were also referred in the Judgment of Madras High Court.

Thus, there is no much difference logically between the Court and the Tribunal and both are meant to resolve the disputes.

My apprehension:

I have the privilege of observing the proceedings of High Court in a Company matter and also the proceedings of Company Law Board. At present, the High Court discharges very complicated functions under Companies Act, 1956 like entertaining winding-up petitions and entertaining applications seeking sanction of the Court for a scheme of amalgamation etc. The Company Law Board also discharges complicated responsibilities under section 397/398 of the Companies Act, 1956 and other provisions.

There are many limitations and we know the functioning of the office of the Official Liquidator at present and we also aware of the proposed move to get the services of Advocates and Experts as liquidators. It’s a serious issue to deal with and requires serious consideration by the Government and also Courts. In my personal opinion, the High Court was able to discharge its functions under Companies Act, 1956 very well and the proceedings of Company Court were effective to a great extent. Instant orders were passed if the situation demands and most of the orders passed by the High Court while exercising Company Jurisdiction were obeyed and implemented by the parties concerned.

But, when it comes to the proceedings of the Company Law Board, many express their dissatisfaction that they are being unnecessarily troubled and many feel that they are not able to get justice though they could establish a clear case before the Board. It is also frequently seen as to the respect given to the orders of the Company Law Board. Again, the powers of the Company Law Board were limited by the express language used in the Act and also due to the ruling on its own competence and jurisdiction. These issues are taken note of by the Legislature and sought to be addressed in the proposed Companies Bill, 2009.

We have seen tremendous corporate growth in the recent past and with the technological revolution and its adoption in governance like MCA scheme, the incorporation and management of Companies have become so easy though there are complications in the Course.

We need to provide an effective and speedy redressel to the Corporate and they can not be waiting for months and years for a redressel. Handling a Company dispute is a complicated thing and requires lot of care, concentration and specialization. It is to be seen as to how the proposed National Company Law Tribunal and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal functions in future.

Note: I have only given a brief of the issue and I am aware of the fact that a lot can be said on the issue.

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In The Nine, acclaimed journalist Jeffrey Toobin takes us into the chambers of the most important—and secret—legal body in our country, the Supreme Court, revealing the complex dynamic among the nine people who decid… More >>

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Because our family courts are not setup to protect the rights of litigants but a so-called ‘higher good’, it’s ripe for distributing injustice and persecution – mostly to fathers and their children. This article explains why.

Thomas Jefferson stated that trial by such a jury is the only anchor yet known to man to hold the state to the principles of the constitution so as not to leave the protection of the individual solely up to the government or judicial elites.

It’s through the jury that ‘the people’ participate in the judicial process and rein in unconstitutional or unreasonable laws and judgments of the state. Without the protection of a jury trial, tyranny will surely reign.

*Our most fundamental rights are in jeopardy in family court for doing no wrong:

At stake are your right to parent your child, to control and choose your income and profession, your right to maintain your professional and driver’s licenses, your right to have or maintain your passport and travel as you see fit. These rights are guaranteed by the constitution.

*What about the ‘best interest of the child’ – isn’t that ‘a greater good’?

Greater goods are part of dictatorships and tyrannies. The greatest goods of republics are peoples’ constitutional rights which includes the protection of ‘due process’. Supreme Court case laws states that the ‘best interest of the child’ resides in a ‘fit’ parent – not the state.

*How are fundamental rights at stake?

Because if the family court judge assigns you to be the noncustodial parent, you lose your parenting rights to your children (i.e. to support them directly, live with them, and direct their lives) and then you’re forced by the court to pay the mother whatever the judge says – amounts that will impoverish most fathers. If you don’t pay regularly and pay it all, you’ll go to jail without a trial.

*What do you have to do wrong to be assigned the noncustodial status?

Nothing! Fit parents – overwhelmingly fathers – have their constitutional rights denied by judges assigning them as noncustodial parents.

The judge – as representative of the state – invokes his ‘illegal’ right to take away constitutional rights of fit fathers for the ‘best interests’ of the children. Best interest determinations are only to be invoked when there are no fit parents.

*The family court setup prevents protection of father’s constitutional rights:

The family court doesn’t allow a trial with a jury. It only permits ‘bench’ trial which means that the judge is both judge and jury for you. So you’re denied the protection of the people from the legal elites and special interest groups that feed off the injustice that the family courts produce.

*Why doesn’t the family court protect a father’s constitutional rights?

Because when you eliminate the natural protections – like a jury – you leave judicial elites in power. More power means a more corruptible system. That’s human nature.

The family court and its affiliates have seized on a ‘greater good’ excuse such as ‘best interest of the children’ and ‘safety of women’ to forego constitutional law and protections for fathers.

*Special interest groups influence on the family court setup and actions:

A host of legal and court-assisting persons and organizations have a strong financial interest in keeping the family court set-up as it is. They together can be called the Divorce and Domestic Violence Industry (the DDVI).

The DDVI is made up of the judges, lawyers, GALs, mothers/women, probation/family service officers, psychiatrists, sociologists, visitation centers, battered women’s shelters, the abuse industry, women’s advocates, the state’s department of revenue (DOR), the federal government’s child support enforcement division…and more! Let’s consider where some of these entities find their financial interest in the family court setup.

The DDVI have interest in:

* Setting larger child support orders.

Both the court and DOR/CSE(child support enforcement (agency)) receive federal incentive payments. Court-DOR (Department of Revenue) agreements send some DOR money to the Court systems. County jails make money by more inmates – who are court-created deadbeat dads.

* Making abuse allegations more easily allowed.

Visitation centers and lawyers benefit by this as well as do Battered Women shelters and Batterers Groups. Incidentally, battering is relatively rare; accusations are very common.

* Aggravating parental exchanges and unequal allotment of rights – as the court imposes.

This makes lots of money and job security for lawyers, family services officers, psychologists, GALS, parenting class coordinators, women’s groups, and affiliated VAWA organizations who receive some $5 Billion over 5 years.

The DDVI, taken together, is a powerful lobby and participant in the rule-making process. They’re not about to favor any change – however fair – that will undermine their positions, benefits, or money and power they’ve accumulated.

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